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Abstract—As the technology of mobile sensors advances, mobility control becomes a viable option that can be utilized to minimize energy consumption in wireless sensor networks (WSNs).
A mobility control protocol re-deploys mobile sensors to optimal
positions to minimize energy consumption for communication.
We identify a unique privacy issue in mobility control protocols
that discloses the physical location of the sink node to intruders
in WSNs. To protect the sink node, we propose a new privacypreserving scheme to secure mobility control protocols against
attacks that locate and sabotage the sink node. The privacypreserving scheme obfuscates the sink location with dummy
sink nodes. Analysis shows that the scheme can effectively hide
the sink location via anonymity. The scheme can also be easily
integrated into current mobility control protocols without raising
much additional overhead. The performance simulation and
analysis show that the mobility control protocols with sinkanonymity have the same near-optimal fast convergence process
and close-to-minimum energy consumption as existing protocols
but with the sink node well-protected.
Index Terms—anonymity, mobility control, privacy-preserving,
wireless sensor networks, sink location protection

I. I NTRODUCTION
As mobility becomes readily available to sensors [1], recent
studies on using mobility as a control mechanism to minimize
energy consumption [2]–[6] have been conducted. Several
mobility control protocols have been developed in which
mobile sensors are controlled to move to the most powerefficient positions for communication. These studies showed
that the saved energy in communication can compensate for
the energy consumption in movement, thereby reducing the
overall energy consumption of sensors. These protocols also
ensure that the communication among sensors will not be
disrupted when sensors are moving to their best locations.
In order for mobile sensors to find their most power-efficient
locations, mobility control protocols yield the location information of the sink node to mobile sensors. Such information
disclosure endangers the sink node, because attackers can easily obtain the location information via eavesdropping packets
or capturing nearby sensors. The sink node in a sensor network
is crucial for gathering, aggregating and transferring sensor
information. If the sink node is located and destroyed, the
network covered by the destroyed sink node will not function.
Therefore, protecting the location of the sink node is one of
the critical security issues in the effort to safeguard WSN

operations. Nevertheless, the protection of the sink location
can hardly be achieved using existing security mechanisms,
such as packet encryption, key management, etc. At the same
time, a scheme for sink protection should not affect normal
sensing, communication and mobility control tasks that require
knowledge of the sink location. To address this privacy issue,
we propose a novel privacy-preserving scheme, named sinkanonymity scheme, that uses dummy sinks to deceive attackers
and hide the sink location information in mobility control
protocols. By hiding the true sink location, the cost of locating
the sink node will be increased and baffle the attackers.
The contributions of the paper are threefold. (i) The privacy
of the sink location is a unique issue in mobility control in
WSNs. It has not been given much attention in the sensor
network research field. Most security and privacy related
research focuses on secure routing, key management, source
privacy, and denial of service, etc. (ii) The privacy-preserving
scheme is the first work to address the sink location privacy
issue in mobility control. We show that the proposed privacypreserving scheme has Φ-anonymity on the sink location. (iii)
This scheme can be readily integrated into the mobility control
protocols to enhance their security. The simulation shows
that the mobility control protocols with sink-anonymity have
the same near-optimal fast convergence process and close-tominimum energy consumption as existing protocols.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II summarizes related privacy issues in WSNs and existing
work on mobility control protocols. Section III provides the
background information on mobility control and the privacy
problem of the sink location. Section IV presents the privacypreserving scheme and proves its Φ-anonymity on the sink
location. Section V shows how to apply the privacy scheme
in current mobility control protocols. Section VI shows the
results of simulation and analysis on performance and the
overhead of the privacy-enhanced mobility control protocols.
Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
II. R ELATED W ORKS
A. Privacy and K-anonymity
Privacy research was mainly conducted in the context of
information privacy and anonymity. For example, packets and
traffic patterns should never disclose identity information. A
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few schemes [7]–[9] have been proposed on source location
privacy in sensor networks. The main ideas of these schemes
can be summarized as follows: (1) Each source node floods
packets through numerous paths to the base station to make
it difficult for an adversary to trace the source. (2) Each real
source node is associated with a few other source nodes (real
or fake) so that they all generate packets at the same time
to confuse attackers. (3) A source node sends a packet in a
looping path that goes through the base station so that attackers
will get lost it. (4) All source nodes periodically send back
packets regardless of whether they are monitoring the object or
not. (5) A set of virtual objects are put in the field to simulate
the behavior of the real object and thus hide the location of
the real object. In this paper, we are interested in the problem
of sink location privacy in mobility control, which is different
from the source location privacy because the sink is usually
the destination of routes in WSNs. New schemes are needed
to ensure the privacy of the sink node in mobility control
protocols.
The sink-anonymity problem in mobility control is related
to the information anonymity in the data privacy research area.
A formal privacy-preserving model named K-anonymity [10],
[11] has been proposed that the record of an individual, upon
being released to a query, is hidden in a group of at least
k records with other individuals. Thereby, the privacy of the
individual can be protected since the release of the record
cannot be distinguished from at least k − 1 individuals whose
information also appears in the release. Various schemes [12],
[13] have been proposed to efficiently create K-anonymity data
sets. In this paper, we propose the Φ-anonymity model for
sink location privacy. Unlike the K-anonymity model, the Φanonymity scheme does not create a fixed number of nodes
to disguise the true sink node. Instead, the sink-anonymity
scheme finds a continous area Φ such that the sink node could
be hidden at any position inside Φ.
B. Mobility Control
Using mobility as a control primitive to minimize energy
consumption in communication has been studied before. [2]
proves that in a single active flow between a source and a
destination pair, if the energy cost function is a non-decreasing
convex function, the optimal positions of the intermediate
nodes must lie entirely on the line between the source and
destination, and that the intermediate nodes must be evenly
spaced along the line. The detail of the control algorithm is
in Algorithm MCM (Mobility Control with Minimum total
moving distance) [14]. MCM has a very nice property: the
total moving distance of nodes in MCM is minimum.
As shown in MCM, intermediate nodes move to their
optimal locations in one round. That can disconnect communicating neighbors [6]. To address this problem, a distributed
algorithm is introduced in Algorithm MCD (Mobility Control
Damped) [2]. In MCD, an intermediate node always only
moves towards the average of its two neighbors, instead of
reaching its optimal location in one round. It is proved that
the connection between communicating neighbors using MCD

Algorithm MCM [14]: Mobility Control with Minimum total
moving distance.
The source node s sends L(s) and its label 0 to u1 . When
each intermediate node ui receives L(s) and the label i−1,
it will pass L(s) and its own label i to the succeeding node
along the path. Such a propagation will end at d.
2: Once L(s) is received at the destination node d, d sends
a message carrying L(d) back to s along the path.
3: At each intermediate node ui , once both L(s) and L(d)
and move
are received, set L∗ (ui ) = L(s) + i × L(d)−L(s)
n
ui to L∗ (ui ).
1:

will not be broken [2]. This algorithm suits the distributed
environment because it only uses one-hop location information
that is exchanged between a node and its left and right
neighbors. However, MCD has a problem of slow convergence.
That is, it takes nodes many rounds to reach their optimal
locations. This is due to the fact that each node has to move as
its two neighbors move no matter whether it is towards or away
from its optimal location. To speed up the convergence process without loosing the connectivity between communicating
neighbors, two quick convergence mobility control protocols
are proposed [6]: MCC (Mobility Control quick Convergence)
and MCF (Mobility Control Fast convergence). Both protocols
use the optimal location information of the intermediate nodes
calculated by MCM before the convergence process starts.
MCC speeds up the convergence process by avoiding the
overreaction of a node to the movement of its neighbors, while
MCF reduces the convergence time by moving the nodes as
closer to their optimal positions as possible. In this paper,
we will enhance MCC and MCF by the proposed privacypreserving scheme to protect the sink location.
III. BACKGROUND AND P ROBLEMS
In this section, we discuss the background of mobility
control protocols and then introduce the privacy problem that
motivates our work.
A. Mobility Control
To discuss mobility control, we assume that all sensor nodes
have the same transmission range. Neighboring nodes can
share their location information by exchanging short messages.
Location information can be provided by GPS or other positioning algorithms such as the one in [15]. To simplify the
discussion, we describe the protocols in a synchronous, roundbased system. All the protocols presented in the paper can be
extended to an asynchronous system. For security, we also
assume some security schemes [16] are deployed in WSNs
so that each mobile node can authenticate its own location
information. When a node forwards another node’s location
information, the information cannot be modified and can be
verified.
We assume that a path from the source s to the destination
d (the sink node) has already been discovered using a routing
protocol, e.g., a greedy routing protocol or one of the ad hoc
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routing protocols. We also assume that neither s nor d are
moving during mobility control. Otherwise, the path is always
broken and a new routing path needs to be established. We label the nodes from the source to the destination as 0, 1, · · · , n.
Node u0 is the source s with location L(s), node un is the
destination d with location L(d), and nodes u1 , · · · , un−1 are
intermediate nodes. For each node ui , 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, node
ui−1 is its left neighbor and node ui+1 is its right neighbor.
With mobility control, the most power-efficient location
L∗ (ui ) of ui can be calculated [2] as
L(d) − L(s)
n

L(s),0
L(d´),5

u1

L(s),1
L(d´),5

Fig. 2.

Mobility control

L∗ (ui ) = L(s) + i ×

s

(1)

Once L(s), L(d), i and n are known, each node can calculate its optimal location according to Equation (1). Distributing
L(s), L(d) and n to each node can be integrated into a routing
protocol to reduce overhead. Figure 1 illustrates this process.
When a sensor s is trying to establish a route to sink d, it sends
a routing request to d. At the same time, it also sends its L(s)
and its label 0 along with the request. Each intermediate node
will do the same thing until the message reaches d. Then, d
sends a reply message with its L(d) and the hop count of the
path n back to s. When each intermediate node ui has L(s),
L(d), n and its own label, it can calculate its most powerefficient position according to Equation (1). All intermediate
nodes can thus move to their best positions using a mobility
control protocol such as MCM, MCD, MCC, or MCF and
finally the path is formed as shown in Figure 1(b).
B. Privacy Issue in Mobility Control
The sink privacy issue with the existing protocols lies in
the fact that (a) all sensors in a path need the sink location
L(d) to compute the optimal locations of the intermediate
nodes and (b) a segment of a formed path can exposes the
location of all nodes on the path. As the sink location is
public to all the nodes along the path, the challenge is that
traditional security mechanisms cannot help to protect the
sink location information. For example, encryption of the
sink location cannot prevent a fully compromised node from
disclosing the information, because an attacker can easily
obtain all credentials (such as keys) in the compromised node
to decrypt any encrypted information. We believe and assume
that attackers have the ability to capture and compromise any
sensor node nearby and thus obtain any credential from the
captured node.
Anonymity of sink location is different from anonymity
of identity. Attackers can eavesdrop packets transmitted near
them and find the identity information of the sink node (such
as its IP address), but this kind of information cannot help
the attackers to locate the sink node. In this paper, we are

u2

L(s),2
L(d´),5

d

u4

d´

Dummy sink node

concerned with the attacks that target to find the location of
the sink node by analyzing packets transmitted near them and
destroy it. Hence, the objective of our work is to hide the sink
location.
We are aware that attackers can use other methods to locate
the sink node as well. For instance, attackers can use special
equipment to trace packets in a traffic flow hop by hop until
reaching the sink node. However, we argue that such an attack
method may not be feasible or may be too demanding in
a complicated environment. For example, a sensor network
may be deployed in a battle field. Tracing down a traffic flow
will possibly expose and endanger the attackers themselves.
Therefore, we believe that by hiding the sink location, the
cost of such attacks may baffle the attackers.
IV. S INK - ANONYMITY IN M OBILITY C ONTROL
In this section, we present the privacy-preserving scheme
to tackle the unique security issue known as sink location
privacy. We first illustrate our idea that uses a dummy sink
node in mobility control and show how the true sink node
should choose the dummy sink node. Then, we propose Φanonymity to formalize the privacy problem and illustrate that
the privacy problem can be handled by different strategies.
Finally, we come up the sink-anonymity scheme that can fully
obfuscate the sink location and prove its Φ-anonymity.
A. Dummy Sink Node
Our basic idea is to use a dummy node d0 to hide the true
sink location information L(d) from all the nodes on the path.
When sink node d receives the source location L(s) and the
total hop count n of the path from its previous node, it does not
send back its real location L(d). Instead, it creates a dummy
node along the extension line of the path. The extended path
ends at a dummy node d0 = um (m > n) and includes m −
n − 1 extra dummy intermediate nodes between d and d0 .
For example, in Figure 2, the actual path includes four nodes
in solid circles from source s to sink d. d creates two dummy
nodes u4 and d0 and claims that the destination of the path is
d0 . Then, d sends back L(d0 ) as the sink location and m = 5
as the total hop count of the path from s to d0 . L(d0 ) can be
determined by Equation (2). Hence, no intermediate node on
the path knows the true location L(d) and the hop count n.
Note that d can choose any L(d0 ) and m as long as Equation
(2) holds.
m
(L(d) − L(s))
(2)
n
Upon receiving [L(d0 ), m], all the nodes on the path compute their best locations similar to Equation (1), but substitute
L(d) with L(d0 ) and n with m. Hence, the best location L∗ (ui )
for node ui is
L(d0 ) − L(s)
(3)
L∗ (ui ) = L(s) + i ×
m
L(d0 ) = L(s) +
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Theorem 1 proves that using a dummy node d0 still guarantees that all the intermediate nodes will move to their most
power-efficient locations as in Equation (1). In the example of
Figure 2, suppose L(s) = 0 and L(d) = 9. When d receives
L(s) and label 2 from node u2 , it is supposed to send back
L(d) and n = 3. Using the dummy node d0 , d sends back
L(d0 ) = 15 and m = 5 instead of L(d) and n. Now, the
intermediate nodes u1 and u2 will use L(d0 ) and m to calculate
their optimal locations using Equation (3). The results are 3
and 6 for u1 and u2 respectively. These optimal locations are
the same as those using L(d) and n.
Theorem 1: Using L(d0 ) and m, all the intermediate nodes
have the same optimal locations as in Equation (1).
Proof: According to Equation (3), the optimal location
of
0
an intermediate node ui is L∗ (ui ) = L(s) + i × L(d )−L(s)
,
m
when using L(d0 ) and m. Substitute L(d0 ) with the value in
Equation (2), we get L∗ (ui ) = L(s) + i × L(d)−L(s)
, which
n
is the optimal location in Equation (1).
Note that L(d) and n are two private values kept in the sink
node d in the dummy sink scheme. If n is disclosed, L(d) will
be disclosed as well. For example, knowing n, if an attacker
captures node ui and obtains i, L∗ (ui ), L(s), the attacker
can derive the actual sink location L(d) from Equation (1) as
L(d) = L(s) + ni (L∗ (ui ) − L(s)).
Hence, a security requirement needs to be enforced in
routing protocols so that a routing protocol in WSNs should
not disclose the actual hop count of a path. We inspect several
major routing protocols in WSNs [17], [18] and find that this
security requirement can be satisfied because the destination
node does not necessarily need to use the exact hop count of
the true path. If the sink node chooses to include the dummy
hop number m in routing packets, it will not affect the normal
operations in routing and forwarding packets.
B. Dummy Sink Node Selection
Although using a dummy sink node can hide L(d) as it
seems, carefully selecting a dummy node is critical to ensure
the sink location privacy. In Figure 3, we illustrate two dummy
node selection approaches: sink-on-path and sink-off-path.
In the sink-on-path selection approach, the true sink node
always makes itself on the path from the source to the dummy
node. Hence, the sink location L(d) is also the optimal location
for the true sink node in the path, i.e. L(d) is L∗ (d) that
satisfies Equation (3). However, attackers can infer the actual
sink location by compromising two nodes in two disjoint paths.
This attack is illustrated in Figure 3(a). Assume that the sink
is accepting information from two sources s1 and s2 via two

disjoint paths. The sink claims two dummy sink locations
L(d01 ) and L(d02 ) and dummy hop counts m1 and m2 for
the two paths. If an attacker can compromise two nodes ui
and uj on these two paths respectively, he can obtain L(d01 ),
L(d02 ), m1 , m2 , L(s1 ) and L(s2 ). The attacker can then find
the intersection of the two paths, which is the location of the
true sink node d.
To counteract this attack caused by the sink-on-path selection, we propose the sink-off-path dummy node selection
approach. The sink node d picks a one-hop neighboring node
h and a dummy node d0 such that h satisfies Inequality (4) and
d0 satisfies Equation (5), where nx is the hop count of node x
from the source s and |L(x) − L(y)| is the distance between
nodes x and y. Inequality (4) states that h’s best location is
in the communication range R of d so that d is one-hop away
from the path that goes through s and h. Equation (5) is a
transformation of Equation (3) and states that d0 , h and s are
on the same path.
|L∗ (h) − L(d)| ≤ R
(4)
L∗ (h) − L(s)
L(d0 ) − L(s)
=
(5)
nd 0
nh
The sink-off-path selection approach is illustrated in Figure
3(b). For the two disjoint paths, d selects h1 and d01 for s1 and
h2 and d02 for s2 . d is not on either path and is one-hop away
from h1 and h2 . However, d claims that it is the next hop to
h1 and h2 on their paths. Hence, when h1 (or h2 ) receives a
packet from s1 (or s2 ), it will forward the packet to its next
hop which is d. That is, d can accept information delivered in
both paths.
The sink-off-path dummy node selection approach has two
privacy properties as proved by Theorems 2 and 3. We will
use the sink-off-path dummy node selection approach as the
baseline to develop our full privacy-preserving scheme.
Theorem 2: The sink-off-path dummy node selection approach does not disclose the true sink location, if any mobile
sensor node on a path is compromised.
Proof: Any sensor ui on a path between a source s
and a dummy sink d0 knows the locations of them. Compromising ui , attackers can obtain the path equation as
−Yd0
y = XYss −X
(x − Xs ) + Ys , where Xx and Yx are the
d0
coordinates of node x. Since the sink node is off the path,
its location does not satisfy the path equation. Therefore, the
path equation does not disclose the sink location.
Theorem 3: The sink-off-path dummy node selection approach does not disclose the sink location, if the intersection
point of any two disjoint paths is compromised.
Proof: Assume that two disjoint paths intersect at point
x. x must satisfy the path equations of the two disjoint paths.
Because the sink node is off both paths, the sink node does
not satisfy the path equation of either path. Therefore, the
intersecton point x does not disclose the sink location.
C. Φ-anonymity
Although attackers cannot directly obtain the true sink location by compromising sensors along multiple disjoint paths,
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they may try to find a proximity area surrounding the true
sink node, because the sink node is surely within one-hop
distance to the paths. Hence, we propose a formal privacy
model to analyze the privacy achieved by the sink-off-path
dummy node selection approach. The model can help the sink
node to compare the privacy when different dummy nodes are
selected. The model also leads to the sink-anonymity mobility
control protocols presented in Section V.
As shown in Figure 4, we put the sink node in the origin.
Assume that attackers have found N disjoint paths. Each path
equation i is denoted as y = ki x + ci , f or 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
Because all these paths pass inside the communication range
R of the sink node, the vertical distance from the origin to any
path is less than R. Hence, it must be true that √|ci | 2 ≤ R.
1+ki

Similarly, in order to determine whether the sink node is
at the location (X, Y ), attackers need to compute the vertical
distance from the location (X, Y ) to each path i using di =
|ci +ki X−Y |
√ 2 . If all di satisfy Inequality (6), i.e. the distance
1+ki

from the location (X, Y ) to any of the disjoint paths is less
than the communication range R, a sink node might be at the
location (X, Y ).
|ci + ki X − Y |
p
≤ R f or 1 ≤ i ≤ N
1 + ki2

(6)

In the example of Figure 4, the proximity area is the shadowed area in which any position (X, Y ) satisfies Inequality
(6), because it is within the communication range to either
of the two disjoint paths. Hence, the proximity area is the
achieved privacy against the two compromised paths.
Given such a proximity area, we define Φ-anonymity as
below. Accordingly, the proximity area in Figure 4 is a ΦP anonymity, where P is the set of the two disjoint paths.
Definition 1: Let Φ be a proximity area and P be the set
of all disjoint paths known to attackers. Φ is said to satisfy
ΦP -anonymity if and only if Φ is the maximum proximity
area in which any location (X, Y ) satisfies Inequality (6) for
all paths in P .
Definition 2: Let Φ be a proximity area and P ∗ be the set
of all disjoint paths known to the sink node. Φ is said to satisfy
Φ-anonymity if and only if Φ is the maximum proximity area
in which any location (X, Y ) satisfies Inequality (6) for all
paths in P ∗ .
The relation of ΦP -anonymity and Φ-anonymity is shown
by Theorem 4 which indicates that attackers can reduce the

(a) 45o

Fig. 5.

(b) 180o

Sink coverage and path selection approaches

proximity area if more disjoint paths are known. The smaller
the proximity area is, the better estimation the attackers have
on the true sink location. However, the minimum proximity
area that attackers can achieve is the Φ-anonymity area.
Theorem 4: A Φ-anonymity area is the minimum in all ΦP anonymity areas, i.e. ∀ΦP , Φ ⊆ ΦP .
Proof: Assume we can find a P and a ΦP such that
Φ * ΦP . Thereby, a location x exists that x ∈ Φ but x ∈
/ ΦP .
Hence, the location x is one-hop away from all paths in P ∗ .
But, a path p ∈ P exists that x is further than one-hop away
from p. Therefore, p ∈
/ P ∗ and thus P * P ∗ .
However, because P is the set of all disjoint paths known to
attackers and P ∗ is the set of all disjoint paths known to the
sink node, we know P ⊆ P ∗ , which contradicts to P * P ∗ .
Therefore, the theorem is proved by contradition.
D. Sink-anonymity Schemes
The Φ-anonymity area is critical to the privacy of sink
location. The larger the Φ-anonymity area is, the better the
true sink node is protected. According to Definition 2, the
shape and the size of the Φ-anonymity is determined by P ∗ .
In other words, the disjoint paths selected by the sink node
determine the privacy of the sink location.
We propose two sink-anonymity schemes (shown in RSAS and O-SAS) that use different disjoint path selection approaches and result in different privacy protection. To discuss
the two schemes, we first model the area covered by a sink
node as a fan area, i.e. all sensor nodes in the fan area report
data to the sink node. Denote the angle of the fan as θ. Figure
5 illustrates the fans of θ = 45o and θ = 180o (the gray areas).
When θ = 180o , paths to the sink node may come from all
directions. Thereby, paths in a fan of θ > 180o are the same
as paths in a fan of θ = 180o . Note that the fan area of a sink
node is normally determined by network deployment or task
assignment. We assume the sink node has θ as a parameter in
mobility control.
Both of the sink-anonymity schemes (SASs) use the sinkoff-path dummy node selection approach. The difference is
that R-SAS uses the random disjoint path selection approach
while O-SAS uses the offset disjoint path selection approach.
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R-SAS: Random Sink-Anonymity Scheme
for Each requesting sensor s do
The sink node uses the sink-off-path approach to select
a one-hop neighboring node h and a random dummy
node d0 such that
(a) h satisfies Inequality (4),
(b) d0 satisfies Equation (5).
3: end for
1:
2:

p1

The sink picks an offset point x in the offset area and
keeps the offset from x to d as a secret.
2: for Each requesting sensor s do
3:
The sink node uses the sink-off-path approach to select
a one-hop neighboring node h and a random dummy
node d0 such that
(a) h satisfies Inequality (4) and Equation (7),
(b) d0 satisfies Equation (5).
4: end for

p1
p2
p'1

d

x

pi
lb,i
p2

p'2
(a) R-SAS

Fig. 6.

O-SAS: Offset Sink-Anonymity Scheme

lt,i

(b) O-SAS

Analysis of Φ-anonymity

1:

The random selection approach makes each selected path go
through a randomly positioned one-hop neighbor and point to a
randomly selected dummy node. The offset selection approach
does the same thing, and, in addition, makes all selected paths
intersect at an offset point x (the black dots in the bottom row
in Figure 5). Hence, in addition to Equation (5) and Inequality
(4), all the paths selected by the offset approaches also satisfy
Equation (7) which states that the offset point x is on the
paths. Note that x is neither a dummy node nor a true node.
Yx − Ys
Yh − Ys
=
Xx − Xs
Xh − Xs

(7)

Figure 5 shows examples of the ΦP -anonymity area (the
dotted areas) when attackers know a set P of five disjoint
paths. The dotted areas illustrate several privacy properties.
First, the actual sink node could be at any location in the dotted
areas. Knowing the dotted area does not necessarily disclose
the sink location. Second, the intersection of any paths does
not disclose the sink location. When a sink node uses the offset
selection method, the sink node can pick an offset point in any
direction to hide itself. Hence, the offset point contributes no
more information than the dotted area to attackers.
E. Privacy Analysis of R-SAS and O-SAS
To analyze the privacy achieved by R-SAS and O-SAS,
we need to identify the Φ-anonymity areas in the proposed
schemes. Theorem 5 shows that R-SAS does not provide any
privacy protection to the true sink node if attackers comprise
sensors in sufficient disjoint paths. On the contrary, Theorem
6 shows that O-SAS can achieve Φ-anonymity to protect the
sink location.
Theorem 5: The Φ-anonymity area of R-SAS could be as
small as the true sink node.
Proof: Because the sink node randomly selects dummy
nodes, it possibly selects two pairs of parallel paths {p1 , p01 }
and {p2 , p02 } as shown in Figure 6(a). Thereby, let P be the

θ

R

d θ

θ

x

Fig. 7.

Offset Area

{p1 , p01 , p2 , p02 }.

set of
Then, the sink node is the only location
that is in one-hop to all paths in P . Hence, ΦP includes only
the sink node. Because Φ ⊆ ΦP as in Theorem 4, Φ includes
only the sink node.
Theorem 6: Let p1 and p2 be the two outmost paths in OSAS as shown in Figure 6(b) such that all paths in P ∗ are
within the area bounded by the two paths. The Φ-anonymity
area of O-SAS is the gray area in Figure 6(b).
Proof: For any pi ∈ P ∗ , let Pi = {pi }. Find two parrallel
lines lt,i and lb,i as in Figure 6(b) such that any point within
the two lines is one-hop away from pi . Then, the area within
the two lines is the ΦPi -anonymity area.
We rotate pi from p1 to p2 . For each instance of pi , we find
the corresponding ΦPi -anonymity area. The overlaping area of
all the ΦPi -anonymity areas, which is the gray area in Figure
6(b), is the Φ-anonymity area.
For O-SAS, the solid gray area in Figure 7 shows where the
sink node can select an offset point x. The farthest distance
R
between the offset point and the sink node is sin(θ/2)
. If θ ≤
o
60 , the offset point could be more than two hops away from
the true sink node, while any path passing the offset point is
one-hop away from the true sink node.
F. Simulation and Comparison of R-SAS and O-SAS
We use three metrics to quantitatively
measure the ΦR
anonymity: average distance pe = Φ D(X,Y ) dXdY , maximum
distance pm = max(X,Y )∈Φ (D(X,Y ) ) and area pa =
R
dXdY
, where D(X,Y ) is the distance of the location (X, Y )
Φ
to the true sink node.
pe basically tells how far away the center of the Φanonymity area is to the sink node in average. pm indicates the
possible farthest location to the sink node. pa shows the size
of the area where the sink node is. Thereby, from a defender’s
perspective, larger pe, pm, and pa indicate better privacy.
Figure 8 summarizes the measurement of privacy in three
metrics. We study the situations where θ is 45o , 90o or 180o .
We measure the privacy, assuming that the sink node has a
few disjoint paths ranging from 3 to 19 in its covered area.
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The results are normalized as the communication range of the
sink node is set to 1. All data points are averaged over 30
experiments.
First, the simulation confirms the privacy analysis of R-SAS
and O-SAS. O-SAS provides much better privacy than R-SAS.
As attackers obtain more disjoint paths, R-SAS in fact reduces
the area where the sink node could be. For example, the area
inferred from 19 disjoint paths in R-SAS is only about 4.5%
of the area inferred from 3 disjoint paths. Thereby, attackers
can estimate a very close location to the sink node if they
can find sufficient disjoint paths. In contrast, when O-SAS is
used, the inferred area size reaches a boundary and cannot be
further reduced as the number of disjoint paths increases. In
other words, attackers cannot obtain the exact sink location by
trying more disjoint paths with the application of O-SAS.
Second, we observe that smaller θ implies better privacy
to the sink node. When the sink node collects information
from a smaller fan area, disjoint paths are more parallel to
each other. Their one-hop surrounding areas thus have a larger
overlap, which results in a larger area that attackers can infer.
Thereby, the sink node is better protected with a smaller θ.
This observation gives a guidance to the network deployment
with mobility control. A sink node is better deployed at the
boundary of a network than at the center. A sink node is
better assigned to monitor a part of the network than the whole
network.
V. S INK - ANONYMITY M OBILITY C ONTROL P ROTOCOLS
In this section, we apply the O-SAS scheme to two mobility
control protocols MCC and MCF and develop two new sinkanonymity mobility control protocols SAMCC and SAMCF
that well protect the true sink node and ensure the connectivity
between communicating neighbors. We also apply the OSAS scheme to MCM and MCD. They will be used in our
simulation for comparison.
A. Protocol SAMCC
In SAMCC, the sink node d picks a dummy sink d0
according to O-SAS for the intermediate nodes to adjust their
locations. An intermediate node knows its optimal position by
MCM, and if the distance between its new position (which
is calculated as the average of its two neighbors’ positions)
and its optimal position is larger than the distance between its
current position and its optimal position, it does not move. In
this way, a node can avoid unnecessary movement.

Algorithm SAMCC: Sink-Anonymity MCC.
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:

The sink node d picks a dummy sink d0 for each source
s according to O-SAS.
The sink sends the location L(d0 ) back to the source via
its neighbor h.
Apply MCM to obtain the optimal location OL(ui ) for
each intermediate node ui .
repeat
for Each intermediate node ui do
Exchange L(ui ) with ui−1 and ui+1 .
Receive L(ui−1 ) and L(ui+1 ). Set L∗ (ui ) =
L(ui−1 )+L(ui+1 )
.
2
If |L∗ (ui ) − OL(ui )| > |L(ui ) − OL(ui )| no movement.
Else if |L∗ (ui )−L(ui )| ≥ M DP R, move to L∗ (ui ).
end for
until All nodes stop

For a particular source s, once a dummy node d0 is set,
all the real intermediate nodes between the source and the
dummy sink will move to their optimal locations according
to MCM. During the process, SAMCC will not disconnect
communicating neighbors [6].
B. Protocol SAMCF
The second protocol SAMCF selects a dummy sink as in
SAMCC. Once a dummy sink is chosen, the intermediate
nodes will move toward their optimal locations as much
as possible without breaking the connections with their left
and right neighbors. In this way, for each node, there is no
extra movement. The details of this algorithm are shown in
Algorithm SAMCF.
Same as SAMCC, SAMCF will not disconnect communicating neighbors when real intermediate nodes are moving to
their optimal locations once the dummy node d0 is set for a
source s.
C. Protocols SAMCM and SAMCD
When O-SAS is applied to MCM or MCD, the real sink
selects a dummy sink as the previous two protocols and then
the intermediate nodes will move according to MCM or MCD.
SAMCM cannot guarantee the connectivity between communicating neighbors, and SAMCD has a slow convergence
process. They are included here for the comparison in the next
section.
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Algorithm SAMCF: Sink-Anonymity MCF.
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:

7:
8:
9:

The sink node d picks a dummy sink d0 for each source
s according to O-SAS.
The sink sends the location L(d0 ) back to the source via
its neighbor h.
Apply MCM to obtain the optimal location OL(ui ) for
each intermediate node ui .
repeat
for Each intermediate node ui do
Calculate target location L∗ (ui ) which is the closest
point to OL(ui ) without breaking the connection
with ui ’s left and right neighbors ui−1 and ui+1 .
If |L∗ (ui ) − L(ui )| > M DP R, move to L∗ (ui ).
end for
until All nodes stop
VI. A NALYSIS AND S IMULATION

In this section, we conduct simulations to measure the
performance of the SAMCD, SAMCM, SAMCC, and SAMCF
protocols. We show how the added sink-anonymity scheme
affects the convergence speed, total nodes movement, and
communication cost of the original ones.
1) Simulation Settings: In our simulation, we use three
metrics: the convergence speed, the energy cost, and the communication cost of the stabilization process. In a synchronous,
round-based system, the speed of achieving stabilization is
measured by the number of rounds of node movement needed
for convergence. The energy cost of mobility control protocols
primarily comes from the energy consumed in node movement
which is determined by the distance a node moves. In our
experiments, the total distance of movement of all the nodes
is used as a metric for the energy cost of mobility control
protocols. The communication cost of mobility control protocols is calculated by the total number of messages exchanged
among nodes in this paper.
For each algorithm, the number of rounds, the total distance
of node movement, and the total messages exchanged are
calculated. In our experiments, we try various network settings
with different parameters. The number of nodes tried is 5,
10, 15 and 20, including the source and the destination. The
transmission range used is 20 and 40 [19]. The initial locations
of the nodes are randomly generated.
2) Simulation Results on Convergence: Figures 9(a) and
9(e) show the number of rounds of node movement for different algorithms when the transmission range is set to 20 and 40
respectively with the number of nodes varied. In the figures,
SAMCD has the most rounds of node movement, SAMCC has
less, SAMCF and SAMCM have the least. SAMCM has the
fastest convergence because it allows nodes to move to their
optimal locations in one round. From either figure, we can
see that the line of SAMCF is almost overlapped with that of
SAMCM. This shows that SAMCF can converge surprisingly
fast. It almost reaches the optimal result of SAMCM.
3) Simulation Results on Energy Cost: Figures 9(b) and
9(f) show the total distance of node movement during the

convergence process using different algorithms when the transmission range is 20 and 40 respectively with the number of
nodes varied. The results in these two figures match those of
the number of rounds of node movement. One very good result
is that SAMCF is so close to SAMCM in terms of the total
distance that their lines overlap in the figures. As we know,
SAMCM achieves the minimum total movement. Therefore,
the total movement using SAMCF is extremely close to the
minimum.
4) Simulation Results on Communication Cost: Now we
look at the communication cost of these protocols. As shown
in Figures 9(c) and 9(g), the results of the communication
cost match those of the number of rounds and total distance
of node movement. SAMCD has the highest cost, SAMCC is
the next,and SAMCF is very close to SAMCM which has the
least cost.
In summary, these results show us how good SAMCC and
SAMCF are compared with SAMCM and SAMCD in terms
of convergence speed and energy consumption. Especially
SAMCF, it almost reaches the best results by SAMCM.
5) Effects of Embedding O-SAS in Protocols: In this section, we show how the added O-SAS affects the convergence
speed, total nodes movement, and communication cost of the
original protocols.
When O-SAS is integrated into the MCD, MCM, MCC,
and MCF protocols, the resulting privacy-preserving mobility
control protocols SAMCD, SAMCM, SAMCC and SAMCF
will have the same convergence speed as the protocols they
are built on. This is because after a virtual sink is created
according to O-SAS, the intermediate nodes between the
source and the sink will try to align themselves based on the
position of the virtual sink. This process is no different in terms
of number of rounds of node movement than using the real
sink. Therefore, adding the security in these protocols does
not affect the convergence property of them. Similarly, builtin O-SAS will not affect the total distance of node movement
either.
Next we show how the embedded sink-anonymity scheme
affects the communication costs of the protocols. If O-SAS
is integrated into MCD, MCM, MCF, and MCC, the communication costs will increase because of the extra message
exchanges. Here we calculate the increased communication
cost (in percentage) over each original protocol if security is
embedded. From Figures 9(d) and 9(h), we can see that the
communication costs have increased for all three protocols
if security is used. The communication cost of SAMCM
increases the most: for example, 25% when the number of
nodes is 5 and the transmission range is 20; SAMCF is the
next; SAMCC and SAMCD are the least. This is because
MCM and MCF are already low-cost protocols, anything
added on will be more outstanding in increased costs than
those higher-cost protocols. As the number of nodes increases,
the percentages fall sharply. Therefore, the built-in security
will only bring trivial communication costs to the original
protocols.
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VII. C ONCLUSION
In this paper, we have identified a unique privacy issue
in mobility control that discloses the physical location of
the sink node to intruders in WSNs. To protect the sink
node, we have proposed a new privacy-preserving scheme to
secure mobility control protocols against attacks that locate
and sabotage the sink node. The privacy-preserving scheme
can obfuscate the sink location with dummy sink nodes. The
analysis has shown that the scheme can effectively hide the
sink location with Φ-anonymity. The scheme has also been integrated into current mobility control protocols without raising
much additional overhead. The performance simulation and
analysis have shown that the mobility control protocols with
sink-anonymity have the same near-optimal fast convergence
process and close-to-minimum energy consumption as the
existing ones but with the sink node well protected. In the
future, we will extend this work to enhance sink privacy with
multiple path segments in mobility control.
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